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Earnings Management of ST-Firms in China A-share Markets 
Abstract 
This paper investigates two research questions about the accounting choice of 
ST firms in China A-share market. Did they undertake earnings management and 
how did they manipulate earnings? ST firms refer to those Chinese listed firms 
whose trading gets special treatment due to two years of losses and/or other abnormal 
financial or non-financial situations. This group of firms stands for financially 
troubled firms in Chinese emerging market. Different from western mature markets 
where earnings manipulation of financially troubled firms is mainly driven by the 
contracting incentives, the Chinese capital market setting provides strong stock 
market motivation for managers to manipulate earnings. Following previous studies, 
I investigate the discretionary current accruals and below-the-line items of ST firms 
both before and during the special treatment period. In addition, I investigate four 
specific current accruals components to see their use in the earnings management. 
Evidence shows that ST firms employ below-the-line items to take big bath in 
two years prior to the special treatment. As to the use of discretionary current 
accruals, the big bath evidence is only found in one year prior to the special 
treatment. Specifically, ST firms mainly use abnormal accounts payable and 
abnormal allowance for bad debts to decrease earnings. During the years when firms 
are getting special treatment, there is no strong evidence of income-increasing 
manipulation in these ST firms. However, when decomposing the ST-firm sample 
into firms that are successful in getting out of the ST list and firms that fail to recover 
during the ST period, I find evidence that those successful firms rely on below-the-
line items but not discretionary accruals to increase their earnings. 
This study extends the existing literature by shedding light on the accounting 
choice made by financially distressed firms in China. Moreover, it is also the first 
study that provides evidence on the ability of specific accruals in earnings 
























Earnings Management of ST-Firms in China A-share Markets 
1. Introduction 
This study investigates whether ST-firms in China A-Share market undertake 
earnings management and how they manipulate earnings. ST-firm stands for the 
financially distressed firms in the emerging Chinese capital market. According to the 
Stock Listing Rules issued in 1998, the stock trading will be specially treated for 
listed firms with abnormal situations that prevent investors from judging the future of 
the listed firm and therefore impair the interests of the investors. Most of those ST 
firms got special treatment due to abnormal financial situations, particularly, two 
consecutive years' losses. 
Previous studies documented the pervasiveness of the earnings management 
behavior of Chinese listed firms driven by the stock market motivation (Haw et al. 
1998，Chen and Yuan 2000，and Aharony et al. 2000). According to Chinese 
Company Law, any listed firms with three annual losses will be suspended and 
terminated. Therefore, the motivation for those ST-firms to manipulate earnings to 
retain their firms' listing status is obvious and strong. The first objective of this paper 
is to test the existence of earnings management of ST firms, especially of those ST 
firms who finally got out of the ST list. 
Not only is the earnings management behavior driven by the mangers' 
motivation, but it is also restricted by the ability of managers as well as the discretion 
space that the firms' financial situation allows. Then how did those financially 
distressed firms manipulate their earnings? Do their manipulation techniques exhibit 
some special characteristics? This is the second objective of this study. As Haw et al. 
(1998) point out that the most frequently used manipulation items for Chinese listed 
firms are discretionary accruals and below-the-line items. Traditionally, only 
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aggregated discretionary accruals will be examined. However, McNichols (2000) 
indicates that the aggregate accruals studies lag both in theories and in institutional 
knowledge of how accruals behave. The aggregate measurement can't provide much 
insight into how earnings management is achieved. Therefore in this study, I will 
examine four specific accruals components in addition to the aggregate discretionary 
accruals. Namely, they are abnormal accounts receivable，abnormal inventory, 
abnormal accounts payable and abnormal allowance for bad debts. 
Prior studies in mature markets found evidence of earnings management 
among those financially distressed firms. However, their results are inconsistent due 
to the different proxy for financial distress and different contracting incentive behind 
the earnings management behavior. DeAngelo et al. (1994)' s findings indicated that 
managers' accounting choices primarily reflect acknowledgement of their firms' 
financial troubles to prepare for the ground of subsequent contract negotiation with 
lenders, shareholders, unions and others. On the contrary, DeFond et al. (1994) found 
firms violating debt covenant reported significant positive abnormal accruals in the 
year prior to violation. In the year of violation, the abnormal accruals remain positive 
after controlling for going concern qualification and management changes. 
The related research in Chinese capital market shows that loss firms are likely 
to take big bath (Haw et al. 1998 and Chen 2001). However, none of the previous 
studies concentrates on accounting choices of financially distressed firms with 
consecutive annual losses, like ST firms. This study will focus on the accounting 
choices of 106 Chinese A-share firms that once had been or still have been traded as 
ST firms from 1998 to 2001 around the year T, when T denotes the first year when 
ST firms begin to be specially treated. 
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Compared with a control sample matched against ST firms by industry, firm 
size, calendar year and listing history, the ST firms are featured with lower liquidity, 
weaker asset management ability, higher leverage, lower profitability and smaller 
equity expansion potential. Consistent with previous evidence on big bath, there is 
strong evidence that ST firms use both discretionary accruals and below-the-line 
items to decrease earnings in one year prior to the special treatment. Specifically, I 
find that the ST firms mainly rely on abnormal accounts payable and abnormal 
allowance for bad debts to decrease their earnings. 
In the years that firms are getting special treatment, there is no evidence that 
ST firms increase their income through discretionary accruals. The possible reasons 
are the limited discretion space allowed by Chinese GAAP and the poor financial 
situation of these firms per se. Also, there is no strong evidence that ST firms use 
below-the-line items to increase income. However, when decomposing the ST 
sample into firms that are successful in getting out of special treatment and firms that 
fail to recover during the ST period, I find income-increasing manipulation behavior 
by using below-the-line items in those successful firms. 
This study extends the existing literature by shedding light on the accounting 
choices made by financially distressed firms in China emerging market. Moreover, it 
is also the first study that provides evidence on the ability of specific accruals in 
earnings management under the Chinese context. The evidence that ST firms employ 
earnings manipulation techniques to achieve earnings may also have some practical 
implications for regulatory bodies. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the 
institutional background of ST firms in China. Section 3 reviews related previous 
research. Section 4 presents the hypothesis development and the measurement of 
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variables used in this study. The sample selection and financial performance of ST-
firms are described in section 5. The empirical results are reported in section 6, 
followed by the sensitivity analysis in section 7. Section 8 concludes the paper. 
2. Institutional Background 
On Jan 1998, both the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange issued 
Stock Listing Rules. In Chapter 9, it stipulates that the stock trading will be specially 
treated when the listed firm facing such abnormal situations that cause investors 
unable to judge the future of the firm and may impair the interests of the investors. 
The special treatment refers to that 1) the quotation list of those ST-firms is separated 
from that of other firms; 2) the quoted price limit is 5% versus 10% to other firms 
and 3) the firm must have its interim reports audited. The abnormal situations include 
abnormal financial situations and other abnormal situations. 
Firms having any of the following situations will be regarded as financially 
abnormal: 
1) Incurred losses for the recent two consecutive fiscal years; 
2) The latest annual report shows that the shareholders' equity is less 
than the registered capital, i.e. the net asset per share is less than the par. 
The ST firms should make announcements before the ST period. Usually the 
special treatment period for financially abnormal listed firms will be no less than 12 
months. If the ST firm recovers its financial situation during the ST period, it can 
apply to the Stock Exchange to cancel the special treatment and make public 
announcements. 
The other abnormal situations include: 
1) The firm incurs loss in the main operation facilities and can't conduct 
normal operation for at least three months due to disasters and accidents; 
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2) The firm is involved in lawsuits with big contingent liability, the 
amount of which is larger than that of the net assets stated in the latest annual report; 
3) The main bank account of the firm was frozen; 
4) Other abnormal situations which the board of directors deem to be 
sufficient to apply for the special treatment; 
For those ST-firms with other abnormal situations, they can apply to the 
Stock Exchange to cancel the special treatment once the abnormal situations are 
eliminated. 
On Apr 27th 1998, the first ST-firm (Liaoning Materials 0511) appeared in the 
Chinese capital market. There were totally 26 * firms (A-share) being traded as ST-
firms in that year. 
In April 2000, both Stock Exchanges issued a revised edition of listing rules. 
There are some revisions on the definitions of the abnormal situation. 
For the abnormal financial situation, three more conditions are regarded as 
financially abnormal in addition to the two situations mentioned above. 
1) The auditor issued disclaimer or adverse audit opinion in the latest 
annual report; 
2) The difference of net assets minus the parts which are not recognized 
by the auditor is less than the registered capital; 
3) If in the latest annual report, the auditor adjusts the net income 
number of previous fiscal period to be negative, there are two years' losses 
consequently. 
For other abnormal situations, there is a little change in the second condition. 
In the new rules, if the contingent liability is larger than 50%, instead of 100%, of net 
‘One firm among them got PT in that year. 
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assets, the firm will be specially treated. Moreover, those firms that are likely to go 
bankrupt are stipulated to be specially treated. 
In 2001, the two stock exchanges revised their listing rules again. This time, 
both stock exchanges restricted the requirements of canceling special treatment. 
Specifically, to fulfill the requirements of canceling special treatment, ST-firms 
should have a normal operation and a positive operating income instead of a mere 
positive net income. In addition, there are two more conditions added to the other 
abnormal situations: 1) the board of directors can't hold usual meetings and make 
decisions about the firms and 2) the main debtors of the firm having been declared to 
go bankrupt, while the firm didn't make sufficient provision for those bad debts. 
According to Articles 157 and 158 of Chinese Company Law, CSRC (China 
Securities Regulatory Commission) may suspend and terminate the listing of a 
company's stock if the company has any of the following situations: 1) its share 
structure has been changed to a state that doesn't satisfy the listing requirements; 2) 
its financial situation is not disclosed as required; 3) it seriously violated law; and 4) 
has incurred losses for three consecutive years. Stock Listing Rules (1998 eition) 
restated the suspension of the trading of those firms with 3 consecutive years' loss. In 
1998，the trading of 0518 (Su San Shan) was suspended. However, there has been no 
specific instruction on the delisting procedure until 2001. Instead, on June 17出 1999, 
CSRC issued a notice informing that the stock exchanges would provide a special 
service named 'Particular Transfer' for firms with 3 consecutive years' loss. The 
normal trading of those PT-firms are suspended, but their stock could be transferred 
in collective bid form on every Friday. The price limit for the bid is also Once 
2 In this study, these PT firms will be included in the ST firm samples. 
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the PT firms' earnings become positive and upon the approval of CSRC, they can 
resume trading in the ST list before they return to the normal trading list. 
In February 2001, CSRC issued 'Operation Methods for Suspending and 
Terminating the Listing of Loss Listed Firms,. Under this new method, PT-firms, 
who made loss in 2000 and failed to get the approval of 6-month extension period 
from CSRC, will be delisted. In April 2001, PT-Narcissus (600625) became the first 
delisted firm in Chinese capital market. 
3. Literature Review 
3.1. Research on earnings management of financially troubled firms in 
mature markets 
Prior studies in mature markets usually regard those firms that are close to or 
violating debt covenants as having financial trouble. Managers of those firms are 
deemed to have contracting motivation to manipulate earnings. However, the results 
are not consistent. For example, Healy and Palepu (1990) and DeAngelo et al. (1994) 
examined whether firms close to their dividend constraint changed accounting 
methods, accounting estimates, or accruals to avoid cutting dividends or making 
costly restructuring decisions. Healy and Palepu (1990) studied accounting and 
dividend policy of firms with a sharp decrease in the funds available for dividends 
during 1981 to 1985. They found no significant changes in firms' accounting 
methods surrounding the increased tightness of the dividend constraint. DeAngelo et 
al. (1994) investigated the total accruals of 76 NYSE firms with at least three annual 
losses and cash dividend reduction. While comparing the levels and changes of 
accruals between firms with and without binding covenants, they only found minor 
accrual differences across the two samples in the ten years before the dividend cut. In 
addition, they observed large negative accruals in the dividend reduction year and 
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subsequent three years for the full sample, even after controlling for sample firms' 
cash flow and sales reduction. They argue that managers' accounting choices 
primarily reflect their firms' financial trouble per se, rather than attempt to mitigate 
the covenant binding. 
While using samples consisting of firms actually violating debt covenants, 
Sweeney (1994) and DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) found evidence consistent with 
the debt covenant hypothesis. The debt covenant hypothesis states that the larger a 
firm's debt-equity ratio, the more likely the firm's manager is to select income-
increasing accounting procedures. Sweeney (1994) focused on the accounting policy 
changes of default firms surrounding covenant violation and found that managers of 
default firms made income-increasing accounting changes to offset tightening debt 
covenant constraints. DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) investigated their sample's 
abnormal total and working capital accruals estimated by both time-series and cross-
sectional Jones model. In the year prior to violation, significant positive abnormal 
total and working capital accruals were documented. In the year of violation, they 
only found the abnormal working capital accruals to be positive. After controlling for 
auditor going concern qualification and management changes, both abnormal 
working capital and total accruals remain positive, but not at a significant level. They 
argued that the severity of violation was too large to be satisfied by manipulation. 
3.2. Research on earnings management under capital market motivation 
The widespread use of accounting information by capital market participants, 
like regulators, investors and financial analysts can create an incentive for managers 
to manipulate earnings in an attempt to influence short-term stock price performance. 
Some studies examined whether managers overstate earnings in periods prior 
to equity offers. Dechow et al. (1996) reported that firms subject to SEC 
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enforcement actions for alleged overstating earnings frequently make seasoned 
equity offerings subsequent to the infraction but before its detection. They argue that 
the important motivation for earnings manipulation in those firms is the desire to 
raise external financing at low cost and to avoid debt covenant restrictions. Teoh, 
Welch and Wong (1998a) found that seasoned equity issuers adjust discretionary 
current accruals to report higher net income prior to the offering. Other studies also 
find that issuers of IPOs report high positive abnormal accruals to increase earnings 
in IPO-year. (Teoh, Welch and Wong , 1998b; Teoh, Wong and Rao 1998). In 
addition, Teoh, Wong and Rao (1998) found that the post-IPO earnings performance 
is significantly below the industry average or similar prior-performance non-issuing 
industry peers. High IPO-year abnormal current accruals predict low future earnings 
performance. 
Other studies documented that earnings are managed to meet some 
benchmarks posed by the market, e.g., the expectation of financial analyst or 
management. Abarbanell and Lehavy (1999) use financial analysts' stock 
recommendations to predict the direction of earnings management. They argue and 
find that firms that receive 'buy' recommendations are more likely to manage 
earnings to meet analysts' earnings expectation, whereas firms that receive ‘sell， 
recommendations are more likely to show income-decreasing unexpected accruals. 
Kasznik (1999) investigated the discretionary accruals of those firms voluntarily 
reporting management earnings forecast. The evidence shows that firms whose 
managers have overestimated earnings have significant levels of positive 
discretionary accruals to increase earnings in order to mitigate the probability of 
potential legal actions by investors and loss of reputation for accuracy. 
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3.3. Related Chinese research 
The Chinese capital market provides an unique setting for researchers to 
study earnings management in that Chinese stock market regulators explicitly use 
accounting earnings as determinant in approving firms' equity offering application. 
The stock market motivation is the most important incentive for managers in Chinese 
listed firms to manipulate earnings. 
Aharony et al. (2000) report that the median ROA of IPO firms in China B-
and H-share markets peaks in the IPO year and declines thereafter. While Haw et al. 
(1998) found that in the periods after the 10% ROE benchmark was set for rights 
offering, the percentage of firms that reported ROE between 10%-11% was three 
times of that for the periods before the setting of benchmark, even when the overall 
economic conditions decline. Chen et al. (2000) examined the distribution of reported 
ROEs of listed firms in China capital markets and found an exceptional concentration 
in the area of ROE benchmark. From 1996 to 1998，there was "10-percent spike" in 
the distribution of ROEs of listed firm. While CSRC relaxed the ROE requirement 
from 10 to 6 percent for the rights offering in 1999, another "6-percent spike" 
appeared in the ROE distribution of 1999. 
Moreover, Haw et al. (1998) point out that the most frequently used earnings 
manipulation techniques among Chinese listed firms are discretionary accruals and 
transactions involving below-the-line items. Specifically for firms reporting negative 
ROE, their below-the-line items decrease pre-tax ROE by 7.4% and 16.7%, 
respectively in 1996 and 1997. These firms also exhibit negative discretionary 
accruals. These findings are consistent with the big bath phenomenon. 
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3.4. Research on specific components of accruals 
Most studies on the specific accrual components focused on the provision for 
bad debts, loan loss or loss reserves of property and casualty insurers. McNichols and 
Wilson (1988) used the reported provision and the measurement specified by GAAP 
as a discretionary accrual proxy to examine the existence of earnings management. 
Beaver and McNichols (1998) examine characteristics and valuation of claim loss 
reserves of property casualty insures. They proposed serial correlation in year-by -
year loss reserve errors as an indication of loss reserve manipulation and found 
strong evidence of manipulation of loss reserves 
Different from other studies that concentrate on one specific accruals 
component, Marquardt and Wiedman (2001) examine six accruals components in 
different earnings management contexts. They find that the accounts receivables for 
firms issuing equity are unexpectedly high. While for firms in management buyout 
contexts, the unexpected accounts receivable is significantly negative. The 
unexpected special items are significantly positive for firms trying to avoid reporting 
an earnings decrease. However, the results for the debt covenant group are 
inconclusive. 
4. Hypothesis Development and Variable Measurement 
4.1. Hypotheses 
Most ST firms got special treatment due to two year consecutive years' 
losses. Based on previous findings, I predict that ST firms would take income-
decreasing accounting choices in the two years prior to special treatment (T-2 and T-
1), but choose income-increasing accounting choices during the period of being 
specially treated. Therefore, my hypotheses stated in alternative forms are as follows: 
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Hypothesis 1: ST firms take income-decreasing accounting choices in the two 
years prior to special treatment (year T-2 and T-1). 
Hypothesis 2: ST firms take income-increasing accounting choices in the first 
year of special treatment (year T). 
4.2. Proxies for earnings management 
Following previous studies, I use two proxies for earnings management in 
this study: discretionary accruals and abnormal below-the-line items. 
4.2.1. Discretionary accruals 
Over the past 20 years, numerous literatures detected earnings management 
by examining discretionary accruals. Several models have been developed to 
estimate the nondiscretionary accruals, including Healy (1985), DeAngelo(1986), 
Jones(1991)Model, Industry Model (Dechow et al. 1995), modified Jones Model 
(Dechow et al., 1995) and Kang-Sivaramakerishnan Model (1995). Among them 
Jones (1991) model is the first model that attempts to control for the effect of 
changes in a firm's economic circumstance on nondiscretionary accruals. Following 
Jones(1991), Cahan (1992) develops a fixed effect variant while DeFond and 
Jiambalvo (1994) develop a cross-sectional variant. 
Since the Chinese capital market has only a decade of history, current data 
available are insufficient to apply the time-series approach. Moreover, Bartov et al. 
(2000) found that cross-sectional Jones model is better than other variant of Jones 
model since it is more precise and doesn't have the survivorship bias. In this study, I 
would use cross-sectional Jones model to estimate the normal accruals. 
Total accruals are the difference between earnings and cash flow from 
operation. However, the data of cash flow from operation are not available in China 
until 1998 when the disclosure of cash flow statement was required. Thus, traditional 
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balance sheet approach is employed to estimate total accruals. Under this approach, 
total accruals consist of current accruals and non-current accruals. Non-current 
accruals are measured as the sum of depreciation and amortization. As Guenther 
(1994) points out, managers have more discretion over short-term than over long-
term accruals. Under Chinese GAAP, a uniform depreciation and amortization policy 
is stipulated and managers have little discretion on deprecation and amortization 
expense. Moreover, Jones (1999) argues that current accruals provide a more 
accurate basis for estimating discretionary behavior than total accruals, because the 
estimated discretionary portion of noncurrent accruals is less likely to reflect year-
specific discretion. Therefore in this study, only current accruals will be used to 
estimate the normal accruals. 
The current accruals are the changes in the components of working capital 
that are under the discretion of managers. The calculation of current accruals (CA) is: 
CA= (ACurrent Assets - A Cash -A Short-tern Lending - A Current Portion of 
Long-term Lending) - (ACurrent Liabilities - AShort-term Borrowing - ADividend 
Payable - A Accrued Income Tax - A Current Portion of Long-term Borrowing) 
Since only current accruals is used, the original cross-sectional Jones model is 
adjusted. The following OLS regression is run for each industry-year combination to 
estimate the parameters in the term-adjusted cross-sectional Jones model: 
CA 丨 TA丨卜\ =a{\ITA, ,_,) + pisSALES, /TA丨卜�+� 
Then the discretionary current accruals are the residuals that cannot be 
explained by the model: 
DCA, =CA丨丨 / T A 丨 � , _ \ + /7^’,_,) 
A 
where a and p are the estimator of a and p. 
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The estimated discretionary current accrual is a broad measure of the earnings 
management. In order to see how the earnings management are achieved, I examine 
four main specific components of the current accruals: the abnormal accounts 
receivables, the abnormal inventory the abnormal accounts payable, and the 
abnormal allowance for bad debts. 
Intuitively, firms who want to decrease their earnings are more likely to 
report a lower abnormal accounts receivable, a higher abnormal allowance for bad 
debt, a lower abnormal inventory or a higher abnormal accounts payable. While 
firms who want to increase their earnings are more likely to take the opposite action. 
However, it is not convenient for Chinese managers to change the inventory method 
to adjust the profit. The financial distress of ST firms also implies that it is not easy 
for managers of ST firms to increase sales by loosening credit policy, which will be 
reflected in a higher abnormal accounts receivable. The ability of ST firms using 
accounts receivables and/or inventory to adjust earnings is likely to be low. 
On the other hand, it is relatively easier to accelerate the recognition of 
purchase/expenses in practice, which will bring a higher abnormal accounts payable. 
Chen (2001) also found that loss firms are more likely to voluntarily adopt income-
decreasing accounting policy such as making allowance for bad debts in an attempt 
to take big bath. Therefore, I predict that ST-firms will more rely on abnormal 
allowance for bad debts and abnormal accounts payable to decrease earnings. 
Following Marquardt and Wiedman (2001), the definition of the four 
abnormal accruals components areas follows: 
Abnormal accounts receivables jaj^^ = AR, - x Sales, / Sales,] 
Abnormal inventory AINV, = INV, - [INV,_, x Sales, / Sales,] 
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Abnormal accounts payable aAP, = AP, - x Sales, / Sales,] 
Abnormal allowance for bad debts AABD, 二 ABD, - [ABD,_^ x AR, / ] 
All the variables are deflated by lag total assets. 
4.2.2. Below-the-line items 
In China, only the reported earnings level matters in the cancellation of the 
special treatment before 2001. The persistence and the composition of earnings are of 
little importance. Therefore, it is easier and more convenient for firms to manipulate 
earnings through the use of non-recurring items, such as below-the-line items. 
Following Haw et al. (1998)，I refer to income statement items below operating 
income as below-the-line items under the Chinese GAAP. According to Accounting 
Standards for Business Enterprise and Accounting Systems for Shareholding 
Company: Accounts and Statements (both promulgated by Ministry of Finance, 
PRC), below-the-line items include investment income, subsidy income and non-
operating income/expense. Among the three components, investment income and 
non-operating items are the main determinants of the level of the aggregated below-
the-line items. 
Then what will be the abnormal components of the below-the-line items? 
According to the above-mentioned two accounting standards promulgated by MOF, 
investment income includes short-term and long-term debt, as well as long-term 
equity investment income and loss. Thus, investment income includes both recurring 
and non-recurring items. Non-operating income/expenses are those gain/loss incurred 
in activities irrelevant to the business operation, such as disposal of fixed assets, debt 
restructuring, assets revaluation, endowment and extraordinary events. Those items 
are mainly non-recurring ones. Therefore, I apply two expectation models for the 
below-the-line items: 1) the random-walk expectation model, assuming the expected 
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level of the below-the-line items to be same as that of last year; and 2) the zero 
expectation model, assuming the level of expected below-the-line items to be zero. 
The definitions of the abnormal below-the-items are as below: 
Random-Walk Expectation 
Abnormal investment income AINVINQ: A investment income 
Abnormal non-operating items ANONCt=A(non-operating income-non-operating 
loss) 
Abnormal aggregated below- ABLICt= A (pre-tax profit - operating income) 
the-line items 
Zero Expectation 
Abnormal investment income AINVINt=Investment income , 
Abnormal non-operating items AN ONt 二 (non-oper ating income - non-operating 
loss)t 
Abnormal aggregated below- ABLIt=(pre-tax profit - operating income)t 
the-line items 
All variables are deflated by lag total assets. 
5. Sample Description and Financial Performance of ST-Firms 
5.1. Sample and Data 
The experimental sample in this study is the 106 firms that once had been or 
still have been traded as ST firms from 1998 to 2001. As Table 1 shows, 42 firms 
among them successfully got rid of the ST prefix and returned to the normal trading 
list. 22 firms incurred three consecutive years of losses and fell into the PT list, i.e., 
their normal trading was suspended and the shares of those firms could only be 
particularly transferred on each Friday. Among them, 1 firm successfully resumed 
trading and finally returned to normal trading list and 3 firms were delisted by Stock 
Exchange in 2001. In this study, I use the symbol T to denote the year when the firm 
began to be specially treated. 
Table 2 summarizes the reasons for firms that got special treatment. The most 
frequent ST reason is the combination of abnormal financial situations (40 firms), 
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followed by two-year loss (34 firms), and net assets less than registered capital (17 
firms). Among the 40 firms that got special treatment due to combination of 
abnormal financial situations, 37 firms had two-year losses. Therefore there are 71 
firms (67%) in the whole experimental samples have two-year losses. Two firms got 
special treatment because they got qualified auditor's opinion. Only 7 firms (6%) got 
special treatment due to pure non-financial reasons. The other 6 firms got special 
treatment due to combination of abnormal financial and other situations. 
In this study, I adopt the industry classification scheme employed by 
www.ciilist.com. Table 3 reports the industry distribution of those ST firms one year 
prior to the special treatment (T-1). The most concentrated industry is the light 
industrial manufacturing (16.98%), followed by conglomerate (14.15%), commercial 
(13.21%) and heavy industrial manufacturing (10.38%). 
A control sample was chosen and matched with ST-firms by industry, firm 
size (measured by total assets), calendar year and listing history.^ I used the second 
year prior to the special treatment (T-2) as the benchmark year. Among the 
experimental sample, 20 ST-firms changed their industries for once. For those firms, 
I picked another pair match firm in and after the year of industry change. 
The financial data used in this study is retrieved from China Stock Market 
and Accounting Research Database (CSMAR). As Panel A of Table 4 shows, there 
are 4784 A-share firm-year observations covered by CSMAR from 1993 to 2000, 
After excluding 997 firm-year observations without financial data in year t-1 and 8 
firm-year observations in financial industry, the number of observations with data 
available to calculate current accruals is 3779. For the estimation of term-adjusted 
cross-sectional Jones Model, I further delete 102 firm-years in industry-years that 
31 tried to use financial performance as one control measure, however, it is hard to find non-ST firms 
matched with financial performance for all the ST firms. 
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have less than 8 observations to estimate the normal current accruals. The final 
sample used to estimate the cross-sectional Jones model consists of 3677 firm-year 
observations. Panel B of Table 4 reports the sample distribution across years. 
5.2. Financial Performance of the ST Firms 
In order to give a thorough description of the financial performance of ST 
firms, I select 15 financial ratios to measure the liquidity, asset management ability, 
financial leverage, profitability and equity expansion potential of the ST firms. The 
detailed definitions of these ratios are given in Table 5. (In order to avoid distorting 
the ratios, I delete 8 observations with negative sales value.) 
Panel A and Panel B of Table 6 respectively display the mean (median) value 
of the 15 financial performance measures for the ST firms and their matched firms 
across year T-5 to T+2. Panel C reports the results of the two-tailed 厂test (Wilcoxon 
tests) on the difference between the mean (median) values of the two groups. From 
the very beginning (year T-5), ST-firms are weaker than their pair matches in asset 
management ability and profit generating ability. Especially，the differences of the 
accounts receivable turnover and the operating income contribution are significant at 
1% level. Nevertheless, there is no significant difference in the liquidity, financial 
leverage and equity expansion potential between these two groups. 
When the time goes by, almost all the financial performance measures of the 
ST-firms deteriorate, especially the asset turnover ratio and the five profitability 
measures. Meanwhile, their matched pairs retain their financial performance stably. 
Thus, the difference of the financial ratios between these two groups becomes larger 
and more significant, and reaches its peak in the year T-1. Table 6 features those ST 
firms as lower liquidity, weaker asset management ability, higher leverage, lower 
profitability and smaller equity expansion potential. 
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Only one financial ratio, the inventory turnover, remains almost the same 
between these two groups across years. The average inventory turnover period for 
both groups is long, over one year in mean and over 3 months in median. It indicates 
that the inventory management is a prevalent problem to almost all the listed firms in 
China. 
6. Empirical Results 
6.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 7 tabulates the descriptive statistics for the overall sample. I report 
mean (median) current accruals of -0.0036 (0.0166) and estimated discretionary 
current accruals of -0.0065 (-0.0019). The null hypothesis that the mean value of 
discretionary current accruals equals zero is rejected at 5% significance level. 
To avoid distortion in calculating the specific components of current accruals, 
I further delete 14 observations which have negative sales value in year t or year t-1. 
Therefore, the overall sample for the four specific components is 3765. The mean 
(median) values for AAR, AINV, AAP and AABD respectively are -0.0159 
(0.0022), -0.0103 (0.0021), -0.0034 (0.0018) and 0.0060 (0.0001). The average 
AABD doesn't equal to zero at 1% significance level. 
The mean and median values of all abnormal below-the-line variables are 
significantly positive. The only exception is the abnormal non-operating items 
estimated by random walk model, which has a mean (median) value of -0.0005 (-
0.0002). However, since the non-operating items are mainly non-recurring in nature, 
the negative ANONC seems reasonable. 
Table 8 reports the Pearson Correlation coefficients between discretionary 
current accruals (DCA) and the four specific accruals components. All the 
components are correlated with DCA in expected direction: AAR and AINV are 
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positively correlated, and AABD and AAP are negatively correlated. However, only 
AINV and AABD are correlated with DCA significantly and none of the correlation 
coefficients are especially high. It suggests that there is no mechanical relation 
between the different accrual measures. 
6.2. Discretionary current accruals 
Although my hypotheses only cover the period from T-2 to T, where T 
denotes the year when firms began to be specially treated. I extend the test period 
from T-5 to T+2 to see the time-series difference. Since the number of samples is 
relatively small, I will base my analysis on the test results of median values. Figure 1 
depicts the median value of discretionary accruals for the two samples across years. 
In Table 9, the first two columns of Panel A report the discretionary current 
accruals for the two samples respectively and the last column reports the difference 
between the two samples based on t-test and Wilcoxon test. There is no significant 
discrepancy between the levels of discretionary accruals for the two samples before 
the year T-2. Supporting Hypothesis 1，the median value of DCA of ST-firms in year 
T-2 and T-1 are both significantly negative than that of control sample at a traditional 
significance level. 
Contrary to Hypothesis 2, the discretionary current accruals of ST firms in 
year T are still significantly negative than that of control sample. The median/mean 
value of DCA of ST firms is -0.0734/—0.0958 while that of control sample is -0.0071/ 
-0.0159. Their difference is significant at 1% level. 
Is the significant negative DCA an indication of the managers' income 
decreasing accounting choice or just an acknowledgement of true financial distress of 
the ST-firms? I further decompose the ST firm group into two subgroups: success 
group consisting of firms that got out of ST list finally and failure group with firms 
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that are still in the ST/PT list. The analysis is reported in Table 10. In year T-2, the 
median (mean) value of discretionary current accruals of success group are 
significantly negative than that of non-ST firms while there is no significant 
difference between failure group and non-ST firms. In year T-1, both subgroups of 
ST firms report significantly more negative discretionary current accruals than non-
ST firms do. While in year T, the median (mean) value of DCA for failure group is 
significantly more negative than that of success group. Moreover, there is no 
significant difference in DCA between success group and non-ST control group 
while the difference between failure group and non-ST group is significant at 1% 
level. Even in year T+1, the median (mean) value of failure group is still significantly 
negative than both success group and non-ST group. Therefore, the significant 
negative DCA for the whole ST group in year T is a reflection of its financial 
distress, but not a result of intentional accounting choice. 
Figure 2 reports the time-series change of discretionary current accruals of the 
four groups from year T-2 to year T+2. It shows that the time-series change of DCA 
for success group is more volatile than any of the other three groups. However 
neither Table 9 nor Table 10 shows a significantly more positive discretionary 
current accruals for the success group than for non-ST firms in or after the year of 
special treatment. It indicates that ST firms rely on discretionary accruals to decrease 
earnings rather than to increase earnings. 
6.3. Specific accruals components 
Then through which specific components did managers of ST-firms 
manipulate earnings? I calculate the four specific accruals for both ST and non-ST 
firms from year T-5 to T+2 and report the results in Table 11. 
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Panel A tabulates the median (mean) value of abnormal accounts receivable 
for both groups and their difference. Except for the year T-2, there is no significant 
difference in the median (mean) value between the two groups in all years. In year T-
2, the median (mean) value of AAR for ST firms, 0.0245 (0.0309), is significantly 
more positive than that of non-ST firms. Similar to Panel A, the difference in the 
median (mean) value of AINV (Panel B) is not significant except in year T-2 and 
year T-3, when the average AINV of ST firms are significantly more positive than 
that of non-ST firms. Do the results of year T-2 indicate that ST firms try to increase 
earnings in the first year of loss? I compare the average value of AAR (AINV) 
between year T-3 and T-2. The results (not reported) indicate that there is no 
significant difference in AAR (AINV) between the two time periods. Therefore, the 
possible explanation that ST firms attempt to increase income in year T-2 is not 
supported. 
The results of abnormal accounts payable (AAP) reported in Panel C is 
consistent with expectation. In year T-2 and T-1, the average AAP of ST firms is 
significantly more positive than that of non-ST firms. While in year T，T+1 and T+2, 
there is no significant difference between these two groups. The results indicate that 
ST firms accelerate the recognition of puchase/expenses to decrease earnings. 
Panel D shows the results of abnormal allowance for bad debts (AABD). As 
predicted, the average AABD for ST firms in the two years prior to special treatment, 
T-2 and T-1, are significantly more positive than those of non-ST firms. However, in 
year T, the results are inconsistent with the prediction, but similar to the results of 
DC A reported in Table 9. Therefore, I conduct the same analysis for AABD in year T 
as the one reported in Table 10. After decomposing the ST sample into success and 
failure groups, the results (not reported) are somewhat similar to that of Table 10. 
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The median/mean value of AABD for success group in year T is 0.0008/—0.0022， 
which is more smaller than that for failure group, 0.0306/0.0641, at a 1% significance 
level. However the difference in the average AABD between success group and 
control sample is not significant. Therefore, the results of AABD in the first year of 
special treatment indicate the poor financial performance of the ST firms rather than 
the income-decreasing accounting choice of managers. 
6.4. Alternative explanation for big bath phenomenon 
Dechow et al. (1995) shows that discretionary accrual estimates are correlated 
with earnings performance. Firms with higher (lower) earnings exhibit significantly 
positive (negative) discretionary accruals. In this study, ST-firms are those firms with 
significant negative earnings performance. Therefore the significant negative 
discretionary current accruals reported in Table 9 and 10 may be a true reflection of 
bad financial performance rather than a big-bath action. 
In order to control for the earnings performance, I employ another 
discretionary accruals estimation model一fixed effect model initiated by Cahan 
(1992). I develop the estimation model as below: 
CA丨,/TA�,_\ + P.ASales, /TA丨+ PJ_5丨,P,T 
+fiuLEv丨丨 + + p . j m + + + + 
where T-5, T-4....T+2 are dummy variables which equal 1 if the firm i is an 
ST firm and year t is in the year of T-5, T-4... T+2, and 0 otherwise. The definition 
of ROA is the same as in the Table 5. LEV uses the Borrowing/Asset ratio defined in 
Table 5. These two variables are included to control for the earnings performance, as 
suggested by Dechow et al. (1995) and Bartov et al. (2000). Yr94...Yr00 are dummy 
variables which equal 1 for year 1994,...,2000. 
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In estimating the model, firm-year observations are pooled together from year 
1993 to year 2000. In order to eliminate the confounding influence of non-ST firm's 
earnings manipulation, those non-ST firm-year observations are excluded if 1) their 
ROE are in the range of 10% to 12%; 2) their ROE are in the range of 6% to 7% in 
year 1999 or 2000; and 3) their current year ROE is positive, while the ROE of last 
year is negative. Furthermore, ST firm year observations that are beyond the testing 
period of T-5 to T+2 are also excluded. 
The estimation results for the fixed effect model are displayed in Table 12. 
The parameter estimate for both year T-2 and year T-1 are negative. However, the 
estimate for year T-2 is not significant at traditional level. Therefore after controlling 
for the earnings performance, I can only find evidence of big bath in year T-1. 
In summary, ST firms take income-decreasing accounting choices in year T-1 
mainly through abnormal accounts payable and abnormal allowance for bad debts. 
There is no evidence that ST-firms employ either aggregated discretionary accruals 
or specific accruals to increase earnings both prior to and after the special treatment. 
6.5. Below the line items 
In Table 13，I present the mean and median values of abnormal aggregated 
below-the-line items/investment income/non-operating items, estimated by two 
expectation models, from year T-5 to T+2. Besides the test statistics on the difference 
between the ST and control samples, I also report the results of binomial tests for 
each variable every year. 
In support for Hypothesis 1, the median values of ABLIC (abnormal 
aggregated below-the-line items under random walk expectation model), AINVINC 
(abnormal investment income under random walk expectation model) and 
ANON(abnormal non-operating items under zero expectation model) for ST-firms 
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are significantly negative than those for the control sample in both year T-2 and year 
T-1. For ABLI and AINVIN, the median (mean) for ST-firms is significantly 
negative than that of control samples only in year T-1. Although the median (mean) 
values for these two variables in year T-2 remain positive, they are still significantly 
lower than those of non-ST firms. The only exception is ANONC (abnormal non-
operating items under random walk expectation model) in year T-2, in that the 
difference between ST and control samples is not significant at traditional level. 
However, more ST firms report negative ANONC than non-ST firms (61% vs. 57%). 
Also, the binomial tests for ANONC of ST-firms in year T-2 is significant at 5% 
level. Therefore, it can be concluded that ST-firms employ transaction involving 
below-the-line items to take big bath in the two years prior to the special treatment. 
In year T, only ABLIC，AINVINIC and AINVIN for ST firms are 
significantly positive than those of non-ST firms. Neither of the two abnormal non-
operating items measures exhibit a significant difference in the median value 
between the two groups. It seems that ST-firms rely more on investment income to 
increase earnings in the first year of special treatment. 
Again, I decompose the ST sample into two subsamples: success group 
consisting of firms which successfully got out of the ST list, and failure group with 
the ST firms which still remains in the ST or PT lists. 
The results for the abnormal below-the-line items for the two subsamples are 
shown in Table 14. In year T, both the aggregated and separate abnormal below-the-
line items under random walk expectation for the success group are significantly 
positive than those of non-ST group. However, both the aggregated and separate 
abnormal below-the-line items under zero expectation model for failure group are 
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significantly smaller than those of control group. Worthy to note, all the six variable 
for success group in year T are significantly positive than those for failure group. 
In year T+1, ABLI and ANON for success group are still significantly more 
positive than those of control sample. In addition, all the three below-the-line items 
estimated by zero expectation models for success group are significantly positive 
than those of failure group. It indicates that success group reports higher amount of 
below-the-line items. Whereas the failure group either reports an insignificant 
difference between the control group, or exhibits a significantly smaller below-the-
line items than those of non-ST firms. 
The results imply that ST firms successful in getting out of the ST list 
perform transactions involving both investment income and non-operating items in 
increasing earnings after being specially treated. To further clarify the nature of the 
below-the-line items, I examine the annual reports of these "successful" firms one by 
one. As Table 15 shows, I found that of the 26 firms that got out of ST lists in year 
T+1, 21 firms (80.8%) incurred important asset/debt restructuring in year T. Of the 
13 firms that got out of ST list in year T+2, 12 firms incurred restructuring in year 
T+1 and 1 firm did so in year T. The remaining 3 firms that successfully got rid of 
ST prefix in year T+3 performed the restructuring either in year T+1 (2 firms) or in 
year T+2 (1 firm). Totally, only 5 (11.9%) of the 42 successful firms didn't rely on 
the restructuring activity to get out of the ST list. Therefore, it can be concluded that 
ST firms rely on below-the-line items to get out of the ST list. 
7. Sensitivity Analysis 
I try alternative ways to estimate the discretionary accruals. First, I perform 
the modified Jones model proposed by Dechow et al. (1995) to estimate the normal 
discretionary current accruals: 
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The results do not alter the conclusion made above. 
In addition, I test whether the exclusion of non-current accrual will bias the 
result or not. The total accruals are estimated as: TA = CA - Depreciation -
Amortization. By using the discretionary total accruals estimated by cross-sectional 
Jones model, I find similar result reported in Table 10.4 
8. Conclusion 
This study examines two research questions about the accounting choice of 
ST firms in China A-share market. Did they undertake earnings management and 
how did they manipulate earnings? 
Following previous study, I use two proxies for earnings management in this 
study: discretionary current accruals and abnormal below-the-line items. Consistent 
with prediction, the discretionary current accruals for ST-firms are significantly more 
negative than those for the control sample in the two years prior to special treatment. 
Contrary to prediction, ST firms exhibit more negative discretionary current accruals 
than non-ST firm in year T. After decomposing the ST sample into success and 
failure group, the analysis shows that the significantly negative discretionary current 
accruals for ST firms in year T is just a reflection of its poor financial situation. 
I further investigate four specific abnormal accruals to see their use in the 
earnings management. The fours specific accruals components are abnormal accounts 
receivable, abnormal inventory, abnormal accounts payable and abnormal allowance 
for bad debt. Due to the limited discretion permitted by Chinese GAAP and 
restriction imposed by the financial distress of the ST-firms per se, abnormal 
accounts receivable and abnormal inventory prove to be less important tool for ST-
4 Due to data availability, there is no data available to estimate the discretionary total accruals before 
year T-3. 
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firms in manipulating earnings. However, strong evidence supports that ST-firms use 
abnormal accounts payable and abnormal allowance for bad debts to decrease 
earnings in two years prior to special treatment. There is no evidence that ST-firms 
employ either aggregated discretionary accruals or any specific accruals to increase 
earnings in the years after the special treatment. 
The significantly negative discretionary current accruals in the two years 
prior to special treatment may be a reflection of true financial performance rather 
than a big bath action. To exclude such alternative explanation, I employ a fixed 
effect model to estimate discretionary current accruals with earnings performance 
controlled. Big bath evidence is only found in year T-1. 
The evidence that ST-firms using below-the-line items to manipulate earnings 
is strong in the two years prior to the special treatment. However, the evidence that 
ST-firms employ below-the-line items to increase earnings in the years after they got 
special treatment is not so strong. After decomposing the ST sample into success 
group and failure group, I find that successful ST firms report significantly more 
positive abnormal below-the-line items in the years after special treatment than both 
other ST firms and non-ST firms do. After reviewing the annual reports of those 
successful ST firms, I conclude that those successful ST firms employ transactions 
involving below-the-line items to increase earnings. 
The results of this study enrich the extent literature by providing the 
accounting choice of financially distressed firms in China emerging markets. In 
addition, it is also the first study that provides insight into the use of specific accruals 
components in earnings management under the Chinese environment. Last but not 
least, the empirical evidence documented in this study will have practical 
implications for regulatory body of Chinese capital market. 
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Table 1 
Yearly Distribution of Firms Getting/Canceling Special Treatment (Particular 
Transfer) 
Entry to ST list Get out of ST list Fall to PT list Get out of PT list 
1998 Ye i 
SHSE 12 
SZSE 14 1 
1999 ^ 7 3 “ 
SHSE 13 2 2 
SZSE 17 5 1 
2000 Ye 16 5 l(back to ST) 
SHSE 10 6 4 
SZSE 16 10 1 1 
2001 Ya 19 n 3 (delisted) 
SHSE 13 9 5 1 
SZSE 11 10 8 2 
Total 106 42 ^ 4 
Table 2 
Summary of ST Reasons 
Firms got ST in year 1998 1999 2000 2001 Total 
ST reasons 
Combination of abnormal financial situations 8 12 4 16 40 
Among them'. 
Firms with 2year loss 7 11 4 15 37 
Firms with net assets < registered capital 3 6 3 15 26 
Firms with qualified audit opinion 5 8 1 1 75 
"Tyea r loss ~ 7 13 9 5 34 
Net assets< registered capital 5 5 6 1_ 17 
Qualified auditor 's opinion 2 2 
Contingent liability > 50% (100%) net assets 3 1 4 
Other abnormal situations 2 7 3 
Combination of abnormal financial and other situations 4 1_ 1 6 
Total 26 30 26 24 106 
Note: Reasons in gray shading are abnormal financial situations. 
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Table 3 
Industry Distributions of ST Firms on Year T-1 ^ 
~~~~ ..Firms got ST in year 
Industry ^ � � 1998 1999 2000 2001 Total % 
Electronic Communication 2 0 1 1 4 3.77 
Textile and Apparels 1 1 1 3 6 5.66 
Chemical Engineering 2 2 0 2 6 5.66 
Construction 1 2 3 0 6 5.66 
Transportation 0 2 0 1 3 2.83 
Real Estate 3 3 3 1 ~ T o 
Energy and Power 0 0 1 0 1 0.94 
Brewage and Food 0 0 1 0 1 0.94 
Agriculture 0 2 1 2 5 4.72 
Light Industrial Manufacturing 5 7 3 3 18 16.98 
Commercial 4 3 3 4 14 13.21 
Mining i 0 i i 3 ^ 
Health Care 0 2 0 1 3~~~ 
Heavy Industrial Manufacturing 3 3 2 3 11 10.38 
Conglomerate 4 3 6 2 15 14.15 
Total 26 30 26 24 106 100 
a. T indicates the year when ST firms begin to get special treatment. 
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Table 1 
Sample Selection and Distribution 
Panel A: The sample selection procedure 
N 
Total A-share Firm-years covered by CSMAR from 1993-2000 4784 
Less: 
Firm-years without financial data in year t-1 (997) 
Firm-years in financial industry (8) 
Firm-years with data available to calculate current accruals 3779 
Less: 
Firm-years in industry-years that have less than 8 observations to apply cross-
sectional Jones Model (102) 
Sample with data available to estimate discretionary current accruals 3677 
Panel B: Sample distribution across years 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total 
Sample of 3779 ^ m ^ m 5 1 0 ^ 8 2 1 m 3 f j 9 ~ 
ST-firms 14 36 59 69 98 104 106 106 592 
Match firms 13 36 68 72 95 106 106 106 602 
Sample of 3677 21 1 4 6 ^ ^ ^ ^ 8 2 1 ^ 3 6 7 7 
ST-firms 9 32 56 66 98 104 106 106 577 
Match firms 5 32 66 70 95 106 106 106 586 
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Table 1 
Definitions of Financial Performance Measures 
Liquidity; 
Current ratio =current assets/current liabilities 
Quick ratio =(cash+short-term investment+notes 
receivable+net a/r+other a/r)/current liabilities 
Asset management Ability: 
Asset turnover =sale/total assets 
A/R turnover =sales/accounts receivable 
Inventory turnover (in days) =inventory/cost of goods sold * 365 
PPE turnover =sales/net fixed assets 
Financial Leverage: 
Debt/Asset Ratio =total liability/total assets 
Borrowing/Asset Ratio =(shoit-term borrowing+long-term 
borrowing)/total assets 
Profitability: 
ROA =Net income/total assets 
EPS =net income/shares 
Gross margin =l-(cost of goods sold/sales) 
Operating income contribution =operating income/lag total assets 
EBIT contribution =(pre-tax profit + financial expense)/lag total 
assets 
Equity expansion potential: 
Net assets per share 二(total assets-total liability)/shares 




Financial Performances of ST Firms 
Panel A: Mean (median) of financial performance measures of ST-firms across years 
(where T denotes the year when firms get special treatment) 
T-5 T-4 T-3 T-2 T-1 T T+1 T+2 
N 35 64 87 105 104 80 56 26 
Current ratio 1.7881 1.6064 1.8738 1.4852 1.3186 0.9185 1.0971 1.0463 
(1.3641)(1.3145)(1.2536) (1.1571) (0.8907) (0.7732) (0.8663) (0.7132) 
Quick ratio 0.9767 0.9692 1.1961 0 . 9 7 6 3 0 . 9 1 7 3 0 . 5 8 1 8 0 . 7 0 5 5 0 . 6 8 9 3 
(0.6937) (0.8286) (0.7480) (0.7273) (0.5437) (0.5067) (0.5340) (0.5171) 
Asset turnover 0.4060 0.4182 0.4230 0.3653 0.3456 0.2773 0.3266 0.2371 
(0.3276)(0.3881)(0.3509) (0.3049) (0.2586) (0.2380) (0.2388) (0.1721) 
A/R turnover 4.4424 5.6372 5.6965 4.4104 4.2544 10.0047 6 .87671 .4844 
(3.3527)(2.9479)(3.4953) (2.3572) (1.9262) (1.6576) (1.1862) (0.8925) 
Inventory turnover 516.83 289.62 328.27 584.90 394.06 773.11 1052.66 442.19 
(in days) (186.72)(153.45)(200.95) (212.89) (195.49) (223.03) (257.51) (273.54) 
PPE turnover 3.2729 3.4134 3.5250 3.8560 2.4293 2 .04371 .7136 2.4970 
(2.3746) (1.9551) (1.7260) (1.3072) (1.0692) (0.8647) (1.0592) (0.9557) 
Debt/Asset 0.4839 0.4910 0.5049 0.5534 0 . 6 8 6 1 0 . 7 8 6 3 0 . 8 8 4 1 0 . 7 5 9 3 
Ratio (0.5151) (0.5161) (0.5448) (0.5774) (0.6842) (0.7439) (0.7094) (0.6692) 
Borrowing/Asset 0.2630 0.2716 0.2893 0.3008 0.3625 0 .41630 .4538 0.3536 
Ratio (0.2475)(0.2635)(0.2889) (0.3023) (0.3679) (0.3836) (0.3019) (0.2908) 
"ROA 0.0416 0.0309 0.0124 -0.0353 -0.1646 -0.1160 -0.0473 -0.0035 
(0.0405) (0.0296) (0.0114) (-0.0234) (-0.1204) (0.0056) (0.0187) (0.0273) 
T f ^ 0.2334 0.1437 0.0604 -0.1665 -0.5990 -0.4072 -0.1963 -0.0539 
(0.2234) (0.1553) (0.0633) (-0.1048) (-0.4995) (0.0206) (0.0921) (0.0997) 
Gross margin 0.2478 0.2108 0.1901 0.1704 0.0488 0.1038 0.1582 0.2372 
(0.2116)(0.1843)(0.1891) (0.1528) (0.0951) (0.1312) (0.1818) (0.2969) 
Operating income 0.0286 0.0218 0.0053 -0.0357 -0.1405 -0.1176 -0.0684 -0.0155 
contribution (0.0228) (0.0187) (0.0067) (-0.0266) (-0.1131) (-0.0548) (-0.0126) (0.0022) 
KBIT contribution 0.0604 0.0516 0.0347 -0.0093 -0.1333 -0.0804 -0.0092 0.0309 
(0.0657)(0.0507)(0.0341) (-0.0014)(-0.0996) (0.0239) (0.0405) (0.0448) 
Net assets per share 2.5883 2.4557 2.3428 2 . 0 0 2 6 1 . 2 3 8 4 0 . 7 2 5 0 0 . 3 2 9 4 0 . 7 7 9 7 
(2.2828) (2.2779) (2.2827) (1.9153) (1.1161) (1.0640) (1.0441) (1.1645) 
Retained earnings/Total 0.0778 0.0740 0.0664 0.0050 -0.2078 -0.3645 -0.4976 -0.2880 
assets (0.0727)(0.0687)(0.0601) (0.0134) (-0.1465)(-0.2682)(-0.2400)(-0.1140) 
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Panel B: Mean (median) value of financial performance measures of control sample 
across years 
T-5 T-4 T-3 T-2 T-1 T T+1 T+2 
~N 41 12 % ^ 56 2 6 ~ 
Current ratio 1.5756 1.7957 1.7419 1.7582 1.7725 1.6425 1.5747 1.6583 
(1.3300)(1.4453)(1.4585)(1.5305)(1.4854)(1.3769)(1.3681)(1.3829) 
Quick ratio 0.7982 0.9384 1.0526 1.0900 1.0899 1.0077 0.9448 0.9902 
(0.7297)(0.8134)(0.7932)(0.8593)(0.8386)(0.7493)(0.7486)(0.8391) 
Asset turnover 0.5573 0.6431 0.5733 0.5423 0.5166 0.4962 0.5316 0.5193 
(0.4596) (0.5095) (0.4736) (0.4215) (0.4210) (0.4093) (0.4263) (0.3744) 
A/R turnover 23.5429 35.1080 44.1488 12.2483 12.5626 18.9357 32.9215 4.5300 
(7.3134)(5.7998)(4.7321)(4.0593) 3.2279 2.9237 3.2825 2.3051 
Inventory turnover 334.70 307.57 342.47 302.73 312.71 443.95 345.38 377.92 
(in days) (190.01)(134.32)(155.56)(146.87)(148.89)(167.54)(157.78)(162.68) 
PPE turnover 5.9734 5.7791 3.3490 3.9491 4.6180 8.7746 16.9500 3.7401 
(3.0267)(2.9892)(2.3570)(1.8210)(1.8367)(1.8163)(1.7068)(2.1266) 
Debt/Asset 0.4534 0.4456 0.4520 0.4356 0.4266 0.4504 0.4621 0.4794 
Ratio (0.4513) (0.4649) (0.4728) (0.4445) (0.4159) (0.4446) (0.4741) (0.5454) 
TeV 0.2420 0.2330 0.2333 0.2340 0.2249 0.2389 0.2380 0.2416 
(0.2388) (0.2276) (0.2368) (0.2356) (0.2253) (0.2242) (0.23 84) (0.2011) 
~ROA 0.0623 0.0635 0.0519 0.0537 0.0457 0.0405 0.0374 0.0438 
(0.0594) (0.0573) (0.0490) (0.0520) (0.0476) (0.0406) (0.0428) (0.0352) 
^ 0.3431 0.3014 0.2576 0.2549 0.2184 0.2140 0.2037 0.2514 
(0.2622) (0.2498) (0.2428) (0.2214) (0.2174) (0.2119) (0.2334) (0.1897) 
Gross margin 0.2613 0.2556 0.2605 0.2626 0.2555 0.2574 0.2486 0.2576 
(0.2253) (0.2446) (0.2446) (0.2443) (0.2315) (0.2375) (0.2486) (0.2184) 
Operating income 0.0590 0.0627 0.0500 0.0450 0.0419 0.0350 0.0337 0.0358 
contribution (0.0594) (0.0597) (0.0457) (0.0472) (0.0410) (0.0318) (0.0385) (0.0362) 
EBIT contribution 0.0804 0.0870 0.0749 0.0767 0.0685 0.0643 0.0591 0.0644 
(0.0768) (0.0764) (0.0719) (0.0749) (0.0697) (0.0622) (0.0646) (0.0585) 
Net assets per share 2.8354 2.6262 2.5702 2.5435 2.5860 2.6405 2.6393 2.4904 
(2.5613)(2.4356)(2.4911)(2.4859)(2.5108)(2.5480)(2.3596)(2.3139) 
Retained earnings/Total 0.0887 0.1044 0.0904 0.1043 0.1022 0.0990 0.0603 0.0686 
assets (0.0848) (0.0852) (0.0826) (0.0999) (0.1008) (0.0987) (0.0734) (0.0712) 
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Panel C: t-statistic (Wilcoxon Z score) for the difference between ST and non-STfirms 
across years 
T-5 T-4 T-3 T-2 T-1 T T+1 T+2 
Current ratio -0.7650 1.0341 -0.5133 1.6155 1.4192 2.6050 2.61^ 81 
(0.0729) (-0.9962)(-1.4275)(-4*3*6*94) (7*8*4*63) (-6*0*5*18) (4-1^3) (3^106) 
Quick ratio -0.9904 -0.2867 -0.7172 0.7927 0.5905 1-6952 
(0.3126) (0.0632) (-0.4680)(-2*6*4*19) (-5*9*9*06) (-4^ 5443 (3.4362) (2.0406) 
- ~ ^ 2.1252 3.50212.6526 3.53743.5664 4.5625 2.89153.3871 
Asset turnover 氺氺 *本本 本本水 *** *** *** *+* *** 
(-1.9905) (-2.9713) (-2.9915) (-4.5137) (-5.1230) (-4.9764 (3.8436) (3.2119) 
* * * * * * * * * * 氺 * 氺 * * * * * * * * 氺氺 
~ 3.2916 1.6898 3.0157 3.44712.7517 T T Z 2 . 9 5 4 5 A/R turnover *** * *** *** *** 0.6707 0.9681 *** 
(-3.6683) (-4.0430) (-3.2233) (-4.4099) (-4.6975) (-4.0183) (4.1520) (2.9556) 
氺氺本 氺氺氺 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 氺本本 
Inventory turnover -0.9549 0.2251 0.1897 -1.1092 -1.0201 -1.5291 -1.64565 -0.4487 
(in days) (0.8602) (1.3420) (1.4921) (1.3049) (1.4723) (-1.5043) (-0.6314) 
PPE turnover 1.5882 1.5940 -0.2287 0.0611 1.4583 1.4141 1.5572 1.2496 
(,„,„„,(-2.4350)(-1.7180)(-2,7456) (-4.2099) (-3.9815) (3.1395) (2.5164) (-i.uiuy) ** * *** *** *** *** ** 
T T I T T T T n o o o i , -2.1676 -5.3056 - 9 . 6 8 6 4 - 7 . 1 8 5 9 - 4 . 9 4 0 6 -3.1017 Debt/Asset Ratio -0.8283 -1.6474 ** *** *** *** *** *** 
, , ( 1 . 7 7 6 7 ) (2.6159) (5.3842) (8.7321) (7.1539) (-4.9667)(-2.7177) 
(I.I JOO) * *** *氺* *** *** *** *** 
Borrowing/Asset , -2.7415 -3.4331 - 6 . 4 0 7 8 - 4 . 5 7 8 1 - 3 . 2 1 1 2 , 
Ratio -U.71U6 -l.bio *** *** *** *** … -1.6487 
⑴汽謝、n 484M (2.6922) (3.2158) (5.8999) (4.3232) (-2.4238) (0.6044) (1.4845) *** *** *** *** ** (-1.1621) 
2.6260 4.2188 5.6339 10.5615 10.3759 5.4790 2.8964 2.0039 
^ � • ^ 本本 本氺氺 •** 氺** *** *** *** 氺 
(-2.3135) (-3.9217) (-6.0637) (-9.6351) (-11.5804) (-6.4101) (2.6448) (1.6563) 
氺* 氺氺氺 *** *** **氺 *** *** 氺 
~ 1.92314.44785.1543~9.929714.3054 6.0772 2.8407 2.8305 
^ 氺 水 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 氺 氺 
(-1.8341)(-4.0438)(-5.7908)(-9.7749) (-11.558) . „ (3.6050) (2.3151) 
* 氺本水 *** *** *** V-0. /:>6J) *** 氺氺 
Gross margin 0.3683 1.8545* 4.3080 5.9255 4.6298 ！ 6541 0.4027 
,n:iA47�（-1.8464)(-3.3143)(-4.8948) (-7.8645) (-4.2093) (1.90) . „ (-0.3647) * txoK *** *** * (-U.iiUi) 
T : 3.41314.9029 6.4162 10.2936 10.7789 7.0433 4.0427 2.5882 
Operating income *本木 *本木 本本 *氺氺 =ich<k + 氺 
^ (-3.1576)(-4.5670)(-6.2691)(-9.0127) (-11.696) (-7.9177) (4.2917) (2.4798) 
contribution *•氺 •本氺 氺氺氺 *** *** *** 本本氺 ** 
2.2350 4.4829 5.6300 10.5786 1 0 . 1 4 5 8 5 . 2 6 4 6 2 . 5 1 4 3 , EB1T contribution ** *** *** *** *** *** ** 1.494 
(-1.7820) (-4.2792) (-5.7526) (-9.2518) (-11.4418) (-5.6330) (2.2840) 
* *** *** *** *** *** ** U.^jjjj 
Net assets per share11781 1 3302 讓 5.2591 1 2 . 0 3 1 5 ^““6. 7 6 6 9 3.1270 
/ Vet Cioocfij orlLlf & 1 . 1 / O 1 1 ^ 本本*水本 本本本 本本本 jj jj ^  
( , n . n n ^o^m (-2.0496)(-5.4676) (-9.9109) (-9.2075) (7.1198) (4.1635) 
1 1J1； ^  1 .jyjv) ^^ 木*本 氺氺氺 氺氺* 氺氺* 本氺* 
Retained earnings/Total 2.9623 2.5585 8.2604 11.7985 10.0961 6.0395 4.1686 
assets 1 .U44o *** ** *** *** *** *** *** 
r 0 71Qn (-2-3652) (-2.4927) (-8.2347) (-11.7484) (-10.2795) (7.2187) (4.5479) 
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Table 6 (cont'd) 
***(**)(*) denotes the significance at 1% (5%) (10%) level based on two-tailed t-
tests (Wilcoxon tests) 




Variables N Mean* Median^ IstQ 3rd Q % positive 
^ I ™ -0 .00360 .0166***~-0 .0512~0 .0893 5TO 
DCA -0 .0065**-0.0019 - 0 . 0 6 7 4 0 . 0 6 7 5 49% 
AAR ^ - 0 . 0 1 5 9 0 . 0 0 2 2 * * * - 0 . 0 2 1 3 0 . 0 3 1 1 53% 
AINV ^ - 0 . 0 1 0 3 * 0 . 0 0 2 1 * * * - 0 . 0 2 7 8 0 . 0 3 8 9 
AAP ^ - 0 . 0 0 3 4 0 . 0 0 1 8 * * * - 0 . 0 1 4 9 0 . 0 2 1 9 ^ 
AABD ^ 0 . 0 0 6 0 * * * 0 . 0 0 0 1 * * * - 0 . 0 0 0 1 0 . 0 0 3 3 
AINVINC 37790.0022*** ^ - 0 . 0 0 3 8 0 . 0 0 6 3 50% 
ANONC 3 ™ - 0 . 0 0 0 5 * * - 0 . 0 0 0 2 * * * - 0 . 0 0 2 8 0 . 0 0 1 5 45% 
ABLIC 0.0023*** 0.0004***-0.0081 0.0109 ^ 
AINVIN 3 7 ^ 0 . 0 1 2 2 * * * 0.0042***0.0001 0.0167 TlVo 
ANON 0.0016*** 0 . 0 0 0 0 3 * * - 0 . 0 0 0 9 0 . 0 0 2 6 sWo 
ABLI 3 ™ 0 . 0 1 6 8 * * * 0 .0097***0.0013 0.0259 
CA= (A Current Assets - A Cash -A Short-tern Lending - A Current Portion of Long-
term Lending) — (A Current Liabilities - AShort-term Borrowing - A Dividend Payable 
-A Accrued Income Tax - A Current Portion of Long-term Borrowing) 
DCA =CA, /TA,,_, -(a(l/T4^,J + j0ASAL£S, /TA丨、卜、) 
AAR, = AR, - xSales, /Sales, 
AINV, = INV, -[INV,_\ X Sales, /Sales, 
AAP, = AP, - X Sales, I Sales, 
AABD, = ABD, -{ABD,_, x AR, /AR,_,] 
AINVINCt= A investment income 
ANONCt=A (non-operating income-non-operating loss) 
ABLICt=/\ (pre-tax profit — operating income) 
AINVINt=Investment income t 
ANONt=(non-operating income-non-operating loss)/ 
ABLIt=(pre-tax profit 一 operating income)t 
All variables except DCA are deflated by lag total assets. 
1. Significance level is for t test in which the null hypothesis is that the mean equals 0. 
2. Significance level is for sign test in which the null hypothesis is that the median equals 
0. 
*** (**) (*) denotes the significance at 1% (5%) (10%) level respectively on two-tailed test. 
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Table 1 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients between Discretionary Current Accruals and 
Specific Accruals Components 
DCA AAR AINV AAP AABD 
DCA LO 
(0.0) 
AAR 0.0063 1.0 
(0.7036) (0.0) 
AINV 0.0501 0.7702 1.0 
(0.0024) (0.0001) (0.0) 
AAP -0.0067 0.9772 0.7709 1.0 
(0.6860) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0) 
AABD -0.1650 -0.0781 -0.0655 -0.0889 1.0 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001 (0.0) 
N二3666 
See Table 7 for variables definitions 
Figure in blanket denotes the significance level. 
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Figure 1 
The Median Value ofDCA for ST and Non-ST Firms across Years 
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Table 9 
Discretionary Current Accruals Across Years 
ST Firms Control Sample Difference 
N Mean" Median'' N Mean" Median*" /-statistics�Wilcoxon Z score ^ 
T-5 29 -0.1495** -0.0330 35 -0.1201* -0.0090 0.3311 -0.6069 
T-4 64 -0.0612* -0.0175 69 -0.0447 -0.0176 0.3976 0.1509 
T - 3 85 0.0263** 0.0080 89 0.0304* 0.0179 0.2249 -0.1746 
T-2 105 -0.0094 -0.0182 105 0.0117 0.0029 1.352 2.3553** 
T-1 106 -0.1022*** -0.0940*** 106 0.0207 0.0228 6.3592*** 6.5531*** 
T 82 -0.0958*** -0.0734*** 82 -0.0159 -0.0071 3.4915*** 3.6588*** 
T+1 56 -0.0516* -0.0479* 56 -0.0139 -0.0262 1.0276 0.8118 
T+2I 26 0.0405 -0.018 126 0.0078 0.0064 -0.5593 0.1373 
a. Significance level is for t-test in which the null hypothesis is that the mean equals 0. 
b. Significance level is for sign test in which the null hypothesis is that the median equals 0. 
c. T-statistic from two-tailed t-test. 
d. Wilcoxon Z score from two-tailed Wilcoxon test. 
***(**)(*) denotes the significance at 1% (5%) (10%) level respectively on two-tailed test. 
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Table 10 
Discretionary Current Accruals of Two Subgroups of ST Firms 
Difference 
Success Failure Success v^. Success vs. Failure vs. 
Failure Non- ST Non-ST 
T-2 N 42 « 
Mean" -0.0283** 0.0032 1.4381' 2.1498**' 0.4261' 
Median' -0.0334* -0.0103 -0.7162^ -2.3605**^ -1.5923^ 
T-1 N 42 S 
Mean'' -0.1145** -0.0941*** 0.6773 ‘ 4.8011***' 5.3805***' 
Median' -0.0891** -0.1010*** -0.0355^ -4.8636*** d •5.733q*h<hc d 
~ T N 42 40 
Mean" -0.0462* -0.1479*** -2.8578***' 1.0194' 4.8828***' 
Median' -0.0489 -0.0854*** -2.7135***^ -1.1800^ -4.8457***^ 
T+ N 32 W “^ 
Mean" -0.0087 -0.1089** -1.8610*' -0.1276' 1.8374*� 
Median'^  Q.QOll -0.1119*** -2.5415**^ 0.9411^ -2.6090***^ 
T+ N 14 ~ 
Mean'' 0.1241 -0.0570 -1.6988' -1.3834' 0.9665 ‘ 
Medianb 0.0501 -0.0531 -1.7745* d 1.0917^ -1.4603^ 
a. Significance level is for t-test in which the null hypothesis is that the mean equals 0. 
b. Significance level is for sign test in which the null hypothesis is that the median equals 0. 
c. T-statistic from two-tailed t-test. 
d. Wilcoxon Z score from two-tailed Wilcoxon test. 
***(**)(*) denotes the significance at 1% (5%) (10%) level respectively on two-tailed test. 
Figure 2 
The Median Value of DCA for ST, Non-ST, Success and Failure Firms from 
Year T-2 to T+2 
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Table 11 
Specific Accruals Components Across Years 
Panel A: Abnormal accounts receivable (AAR) 
ST Firms Control Sample Difference 
Wilcoxon 
N Mean" Median'' N Mean" Median'' /-statistics Z score 
T-5 35 0.0234** 0.0130* 41 0.0282* 0.0065 0.2506 0.5315 
T-4 64 0.0218*** 0.0153 72 0.0146** 0.0085 -0.7163 0.5297 
T-3 85 0.0141** 0.0079 90 0.0173** 0.0055 0.3181 -0.4314 
T-2 105 0.0309*** 0.0245*** 106 -0.0003 0.0099 -2.8858*** 2.6194*** 
T-1 104 0.0063 0.0061** 106 -0.0018 -0.0007 -0.8543 1.5933 
T 79 0.0108 0.0031 82 -0.0394 0.0011 -1.3733 0.9959 
T+1 54 -1.2380 -0.0019 56 -0.0203* -0.0066 1.002 0.6727 
T+2 26 -0.0314* -0.003 26 -0.0243 -0.0105 0.2371 -0.4668 
Panel B: Abnormal inventory (AINV) 
ST Firms Control Sample Difference 
Wilcoxon 
N Mean" Median'' N Mean" Median'' ^statistics Z score 
T-5 35 0.0156 0.0178 41 -0.0382 0.0202 -0.8551 -0.0313 
T-4 64 -0.0078 0.0195** 72 0.03258** 0.0172 1.075 0.2289 
T-3 85 0.0349*** 0.0169** 90 -0.0028 0.0009 -1.726* 2.0584** 
T-2 105 0.0184* 0.0121*** 106 -0.0044 -0.0039 -1.5526 3.0388*** 
T-1 104 -0.0013 0.003 106 -0.0319 0.0079** -0.7931 -0.8415 
T 79 -0.0157 0 82 0.0024 0.0054 0.7232 -1.3239 
T+1 54 -0.4606 -0.0002 56 -0.022 -0.0068 1.3827 0.9955 
T+2 26 -0.0703 -0.0011 26 -0.0041 -0.003 0.8299 0.4483 
Panel C: Abnormal accounts payable (AAP) 
ST Firms Control Sample Difference 
Wilcoxon 
N Mean" Median'' N Mean" Median'' f statistics Z score 
T-5 35 -0.0015 0.0018 41 -0.0038 0.008 -0.1764 -0.3647 
T - 4 64 0.0189*** 0.0100** 72 0.0157** 0.0098** -0.3227 0.3423 
T - 3 85 0.0079 0.0053** 90 -0.0085 -0.0009 -1.6402 1.7480* 
T-2 105 0.0170*** 0.0126*** 106 0.0023 0.0014 -2.5182** 3.0929*** 
T-1 104 0.0125*** 0.0091*** 106 0.0006 0.0008 -1.4041 2.7721*** 
T 79 -0.0008 0.0055* 82 -0.0086 0.000045 -0.4771 1.17 
T+1 54 -0.3726 -0.0017 56 -0.0151** -0.0004 1.0142 0.0388 
T+2 26 -0.0286 -0.0041 26 -0.0147 -0.0037 0.4702 0.4484 
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Panel D: Abnormal allowance for bad debts (AABD) 
ST Firms Control Sample Difference 
Wilcoxon 
N Mean" Median" N Mean" Median'' /-statistics Z score 
T-5 35 -0.0004 -0.00002 41 0.0003* 0.00003* 1.0746 _ 1.43 83 
T-4 64 -0.0001 -0.000002 72 0.0001 0 1.1306 -0.8267 
T-3 85 0.0004 0 90 0.0004** 0.00002** 0.1147 -1.1738 
T-2 105 0.0145*** 0.0001** 106 0.0040*** 0 -2.821*** 1.9862** 
T-1 104 0.0353*** 0.0065*** 106 0.0047*** 0.00002* -4.1093*** 3.9647*** 
T 79 0.0323*** 0.0045*** 82 0.0069*** 0.0003*** -2.5991** 2.0723** 
T+1 54 0.0388*** 0.0100*** 56 0.0147*** 0.0060*** -1.7989* 1.4021 
t + 2 26 -0.0042 -0.0008 26 -0.0048 0 -0.1262 0.3568 
a. Significance level is for t-test in which the null hypothesis is that the mean equals 0. 
b. Significance level is for sign test in which the null hypothesis is that the median equals 0. 
***(**)(*) denotes the significance at 1% (5%) (10%) level respectively on two-tailed test. 
See Table 7 for variable definition 
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Table 12 
Estimation Results of Fixed Effect Model 
Model. + 鈔 - 2 " 
• +j3��LEV；, 例 4 + A 例 例 6+辟5 例 例 
Parameter Estimate Prob >|T| 
—a -8502432 0.0001 ‘ 
Asales 0.0411 0.0001 
T-5 -0.1491 0.0001 
T-4 -0.0057 0.8059 
T-3 0.0152 0.4538 
T-2 -0.0168 0.3714 
T-1 -0.0548 0.0067 
T -0.0579 0.0078 
T+1 -0.0081 0.7493 
T+2 0.0829 0.0226 
ROA 0.3305 0.0001 
LEV -0.0453 0.0508 
Yr94 -0.5194 0.0001 
Yr96 0.0479 0.0001 
Yr97 0.0585 0.0008 
Yr98 0.0785 0.0001 
Yr99 0.0216 0.0393 
YrOO 0.0240 0.0139 
N=2716AdjR^= 0.3638 “ 
Where T-5,…，T+2 are dummy variables which equal 1 if firm i is an ST firm and 
year t isin the year of T-5,..., T+2, and 0 otherwise. 
ROA=net income/total assets 
LEV=(short-term borrowing + long-term borrowing)/total assets 




A b n o r m a l Be low-the-Line Items Across Years 
P舰,克.Abnormal aggregated below-the-line items under random walk expectations 
(ABLIC) 
ST Firms Control Sample Difference 
N Mean" % positive N Mean" % positive /-statistics 
Median'' Asymp. Sis' Median'' Asymp. Sis." Wilcoxon Z score 
T-5 35 0.0049 51% 41 0.0007 51% -0.5977 
0.0002 1.000 0.0019 1.000 -0.4481 
T-4 66 0.0004 44% 72 0.0029 53% 0.6139 
-0.0036 0.389 0.00 J5 0.724 -1.511 
T-3 87 -0.0021 48% 90 0.0033 59% 1.3017 
-0.001 0.830 0.001 0.114 -1.6036 
T-2 106 -0.0086*** 36% 106 0.0086*** 56% 3.7831*** 
-0.0051*** 0.005 0.0009 0.285 3.8055*** 
T-1 106 -0.0214*** 28% 106 -0.0003 57% 3.2728*** 
-0.0102*** 0.000 0.0022 0.207 4.0429*** 
T 82 0.0293** 62% 82 0.0062* 54% -1.8817** 
0.0155** 0.036 0.0007 0.581 -2.1623** 
T+1 56 0.0116 59% 56 -0.0002 48% -1.0187 
0.0037 0.229 -0.0009 0.894 -1.0096 
T+2 26 -0.0183 38% 26 0.0088 42% 1.179 
-0.0082 0.327 -0.0017 0.556 0.9059 
Panel B: Abnormal aggregated below-the-line items under zero expectation model (ABLI) 
ST Firms Control Sample Difference 
N Mean" % positive N Mean" % positive /-statistics 
Medianb Asymp. Median'^ Asymp. Sig.^ Wilcoxon Z score 
T-5 34 0.0254*** 83% 41 0.0195*** 88% -0.8531 
0.0124*** 0.000 0.0109*** 0.000 0.7086 
T-4 66 0.0210*** 89% 72 0.0151*** 88% -1.2683 
0.0140*** 0.000 0.0098*** 0.000 0.7309 
T-3 87 0.0140*** 80% 90 0.0167*** 92% 0.6511 
0.0089*** 0.000 0.0125*** 0.000 -1.3483 
T-2 106 0.0039 65% 106 0.0223*** 86% 4.1889*** 
0.0029*** 0.003 0.0123*** 0.000 4.5154*** 
T-1 106 -0.0189*** 33% 106 0.0185*** 89% 7.0674*** 
-0.0010*** 0.001 0.0134*** 0.000 8.6735*** 
T 82 0.0111 59% 82 0.0206*** 87% 1.0513 
0.0037 0.151 0.0122*** 0.000 2.0933 
T+1 56 0.0227*** 70% 56 0.0152*** 77% -0.8379 
0.0163*** 0.005 0.0064*** 0.000 -0.8292 
T+2 26 0.0211** 69% 26 0.0274 88% 0.3285 
0.0084 * 0.078 0.0097*** 0.000 -0.0641 
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Panel C: Abnormal investment income under random walk expectation model (AINVINC) 
ST Firms Control Sample Difference 
N Mean^ % positive N Mean" % positive ^-statistics 
Median'' Asymp. Sig.� Median'' Asymp. SisJ^ Wilcoxon Zscore 
T-5 35 0.0039 43% 41 0.0027 56% -0.1961 
-0.0007 0.499 0.001 0.532 -0.6774 
T-4 66 0.0007 47% 72 0.0011 46% 0.1162 
-0.0012 0.712 -0.0003 0.556 -1.1274 
T-3 87 -0.002 41% 90 0.0028** 57% 1.6396 
-0.0008 0.133 0.0005 0.246 -1.9968** 
T-2 106 -0.0057** 33% 106 0.0078*** 50% 3.5688*** 
-0.0022*** 0.001 0.000006 1.000 3.8212*** 
T-1 106 -0.0128*** 32% 106 0.0002 52% 2.6360*** 
-0.0020*** 0.000 0.0003 0J71 2.9255*** 
T 82 0.0232** 61% 82 0.0006 43% -2.3987** 
0.0035* 0.060 -0.001 0.224 -3.0010*** 
T+1 56 0.0059 55% 56 0.0048* 57% -0.1487 
0.0007 0.504 0.0015 0.350 -0.1775 
T+2 26 -0.0041 42% 26 0.0094 54% 0.7645 
-0.000004 0.556 0.0008 0.845 0.4668 
Panel D: Abnormal investment income under zero-expectation model (AINVIN) 
ST Firms Control Sample Difference 
N Mean" % positive N Mean" % positive ^-statistics 
Median'' Asymp. Sis.'' Median'' Asymp. Sis.'' Wilcoxon Z score 
T-5 35 0.0226 91% 41 0.0168 98% -0.8892 
0.0117 0.000 0.0075 0.000 0.9066 
T-4 66 0.0181*** 92% 72 0.0122*** 92% -1.4408 
0.0071*** 0.000 0.0058*** 0.000 0.4156 
T - 3 87 0.0116*** 85% 90 0.0131*** 90% 0.5325 
0.0053*** 0.000 0.0074*** 0.000 -1J062 
T-2 106 0.0053** 61% 106 0.0172*** 88% 3.1561*** 
0.0006*** 0.025 0.0074*** 0.000 4.4663*** 
T-1 106 -0.0084** 46% 106 0.0146*** 84% 5.7299*** 
-0.0002 0.497 0.0079*** 0.000 3.3706*** 
T 82 0.0142** 55% 82 0.0116*** 73% -0.429 
0.0004 0.440 0.0042*** 0.000 1.9389* 
T + 1 56 0.0151** 57% 56 0.0136*** 70% -0.2107 
0.0003* 0.350 0.0022*** 0.005 0.9867 
T+2 26 0.0038 62% 26 0.0225 77% 1.0722 
0.0015* 0.327 0.0057*** 0.011 U ^ 
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Panel E: Abnormal non-operating items under random walk expectation model 
(ANONC) 
ST Firms Control Sample Difference 
N Mean'' % positive N Mean® % positive /-statistics 
Median^ Asymp. Sig, Median'' Asymp. Sis."" Wilcoxon Z score 
T-5 35 0.0004 49% 41 0.0004 59% -0.0075 
-0.0001 1,000 0.0003 0.349 -0.5315 
T-4 66 -0.0006 45% 72 0.0019 46% 1.5385 
-0.0003 0.538 -0.0002 0.556 -0.6585 
T-3 87 -0.0001 41% 90 -0.00002 49% -0.1162 
-0.0004 0.133 -0.00002 0.916 -0.7702 
T-2 106 -0.0020** 39% 106 -0.0007 43% 1.084 
-0.0004** 0.025 -0.0003 0.207 0.702 
T-1 106 -0.0103*** 34% 106 -0.0015** 44% 3.3515*** 
-0.0014*** 0.001 -0.0002 0.285 2.5561** 
T 82 0.0042 61% 82 0.0035** 52% -0.1123 
0.0024* 0.060 0.0001 0.740 -1.5375 
T+1 56 0.0064 48% 56 -0.0030** 41% -1.0343 
-0.0001 0.894 -0.0003 0.229 -0.3986 
T+2 26 -0.0174 27% 26 0.0018 58% 1.3405 
-0.0014** 0.327 0.0002 0.556 2.0589** 
Panel F: Abnormal non-operatins items under zero expectation model (ANON) 
ST Firms Control Sample Difference 
N Mean" % positive N Mean'' % positive ^-statistics 
Median'' Asymp. Sig.^. Median'' Asymp. Sig/ Wilcoxon Zscore 
T-5 35 0.0021 66% 41 0.0018 63% -0.1571 
0.0011* 0.091 0.0002 0.118 0.8545 
T-4 66 0.0023** 61% 72 0.0029** 54% 0.3944 
0.0007* 0.110 0.0001 0.556 0.8844 
T-3 87 0.0019* 52% 90 0.0026** 56% 0.5209 
0.00003 0.830 0.0002 0.343 -0.9756 
T-2 106 -0.0004 38% 106 0.0029*** 54% 2.9784*** 
-0.0003** 0.015 0.0002 0.497 3.0957*** 
T-1 106 -0.0108*** 25% 106 0.0009 49% 4.7837*** 
-0.0018*** 0.000 -0.00001 0.923 5.5857*** 
T 82 -0.0054 55% 82 0.0045*** 55% 1.7290* 
0.0001 0.440 0.0002 0.440 0.7715 
T+1 56 0.0026 55% 56 0.0002 57% -1.0437 
0.0008 0,504 0.0002 0.350 -0.9223 
T+2 26 0.0099* 58% 26 0.0027** 62% -1.2745 
0.0014 0.556 0.0005 0.327 -0.6131 
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Table 13 (Cont'd) 
a. Significance level is for t-test in which the null hypothesis is that the mean equals 
0. 
b. Significance level is for sign test in which the null hypothesis is that the median 
equals 0. 
c. Asymptotic significance is based on two-tailed binomial tests with test proportion 
of 50%. 
***(**)(*) denotes the significance at 1% (5%) (10%) level respectively on two-
tailed test. 
See Table 7 for variable definition 
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Table 14 
The Abnormal Below-the-line Items for Subgroups 
Panel A: Year T 
SuccessrN=42^ Failure Difference d’e 
% 
Mean" % positive Mean" positive Success vs. Success vs. Failure vs. 
Asymp. Asymp. failure control control 
Median'' Sis". Median'' Sis' 
ABLIC 0.0466*** 76% 0.0112 48% -1.4936 -4.0624*** -0.2268 
0.0384*** 0.00] -0.0007 0.874 -2.7784*** 3.7776*** -0.3136 
A B U 0.0297*** 79% -0.0085 38% -2.2427** -1.2972 1.8101* 
0.0233*** 0.000 -0.0038 0.155 -2.7803*** 1.2117 -4.7257*** 
AINVINC 0.0259*** 6 9 % 0.0204** 5 3 % -0.2972 -3.2909*** -1.1472 
0.0088** 0.021 0.0001 0.874 -2.0826*** 3.9782*** 0.8644 
AINV 0.0210*** 67% 0.0074 43% -1.0979 -1.4987 0.3737 
0.0075** 0.045 -0.0008 0.429 -2.0938*** 0.5835 -3.8206*** 
ANONC 0.0165** 71% -0.0088 50% -2.0847** -1.9938* 1.1668 
0.0063*** 0.009 -0.00003 1.000 -2.0548** 2.7903*** -0.3300 
ANON 0.0054 60% -0.0167** 50% -2.0051* -0.1973 2.0604** 
0.0004 0.28 -0.00001 1.000 -2.0177* 0.6151 -1.9225* 
Panel B: Year T+1 
SuccessrN=32^ Failure (N=24^ Difference^'" 
Mean" % positive Mean" % positive Success vs. Success vs. Failure vs. 
Asymp. Asymp. failure control control 
Median" Sis'. Median" Sig." 
ABLIC 0.0115 59% 0.0117 58% 0.0071 -0.8834 -0.5986 
0.0079 0.377 0.0034 0.541 -0.3063 1.0452 0.5512 
ABLI 0.0421*** 88% -0.0033 46% -3.0841*** -2.5489** 1.5535 
0.0289*** 0.000 -0.0004 0.839 -3.303]*** 2.9622*** -2.0841** 
AINVINC 0.0106 59% -0.0003 50% -0.7545 -0.5690 0.4652 
0.0016 0.377 -0.00004 1.000 -0.7699 0.5769 -0.3727 
AINV 0.0256** 72% 0.0011 38% -2.3982** -1.1683 2.1701** 
0.0017*** 0.022 -0.00005 0.307 -2.7749*** 0.5510 -2.4520** 
ANONC 0.0030 53% 0.0108 42% 0.3957 -0.7095 -0.7712 
0.0005 0.860 -0.0006 0.541 0.0911 0.4207 0.2047 
ANON 0.0146*** 69% -0.0064 38% -1.9673* -2.7625*** 0.7012 
0.0026* 0.052 -0.00064 0.307 -2.2103** 2.3550** -1.1811 
a. Significance level is for t-test in which the null hypothesis is that the mean equals 0. 
b. Significance level is for sign test in which the null hypothesis is that the median equals 0. 
c. Asymptotic significance is based on two-tailed binomial tests with test proportion of 50%. 
d. T-statistic from two-tailed t-test. 
e. Wilcoxon Z score fi-om two-tailed Wilcoxon test. 
***(**)(*) denotes the significance at 1% (5%) (10%) level respectively on two-tailed test. 
See Table 7 for variable definition 
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Table 15 
The Yearly Distribution of Material Asset/Debt Restructuring of Firms 
Successfully Got of ST List 
~~~ IN YEAR 丁 T+1 T+2 None Total 
Got out of ST in y e ^ — 
r+1 ^ — 
^ J 12 13 
r J Z Z Z Z Z I Z Z Z A Z I I I I I Z Z Z J _ _ _ 
T o t a l I l Z I Z l Z Z I i r 1/ | 5 k 
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